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There is a strong correlation between the size of an agency’s jurisdiction (in terms of population, not land area), and the existence of specialized units. That is, the bigger the city, the more specialized officers tend to be within that city’s police department. The most common specialized units within American police departments are traffic units and drug enforcement units. How such units operate depends largely on departmental policy, but national priorities can also be important because the national government often funds law enforcement initiatives through grants.
Special Weapons and Tactics (S.W.A.T.) Teams
Until the late 1960s police agencies throughout the United States responded to crisis or special threat situations—such as those involving barricaded gunmen and hostages—on an ad hoc basis, simply deploying as many officers as seemed appropriate to handle the situation in whatever way seemed appropriate at the time. This practice proved (tragically) ineffective several times during the tumultuous 1960s—such as when sniper Charles Whitman launched a murderous rampage in Austin, Texas, claiming forty-five victims in 1966—and police agencies began to develop specialized units to handle crisis situations in a systematic fashion.
These specially equipped units were trained to employ tactics that would not typically be used in other realms of police work. Carrying armaments such as rifles and tear gas, and trained to work as a team to contain, control, and de-escalate the various crises they would be called to encounter, these units were christened Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Teams. Over the years, police agencies have assigned a variety of appellations—such as TAG (Tactical Action Group) and ERT (Emergency Response Team)—to their crisis response units, but the title commonly associated with these specialized units is SWAT.
Since their inception, SWAT teams across the United States have taken a variety of forms, have been organized in a variety of ways, and have been called upon to handle a variety of types of crisis and special threat situations. Some agencies employ full-time teams, while others structure their SWAT units as part-time entities wherein team members have a primary assignment in some other detail (e.g., patrol) and come together for training and crisis response, while still other agencies have teams that include both full- and part-time SWAT officers.
Many larger agencies have their own SWAT team, while many smaller ones participate in multi-jurisdictional teams that include officers from several different agencies. SWAT teams may handle a myriad of assignments apart from hostage and barricaded subject situations. These chores include dignitary protection, responding to civil disturbances, stakeouts, and the service of search and arrest warrants in situations that pose a greater than normal risk of injury to the police. Indeed, the first major shootout involving a SWAT team in the United States occurred when a group of Los Angeles Police Department SWAT officers attempted to serve a warrant on the local headquarters of the Black Panther Party in December 1969.
Since the advent of SWAT in the late 1960s, the inventory of SWAT equipment has increased dramatically. Today the accouterments kept by these teams range from simple tools such as ladders and ropes to highly sophisticated surveillance and listening devices. In recent years, SWAT teams have added to their stores an array of nonlethal weapons, such as impact munitions (e.g., bean bags) that can be fired from shotguns and tear gas launchers, in order to capture combative subjects without severely injuring or killing them.
In a related vein, the available evidence indicates that although contemporary SWAT teams are equipped with a variety of deadly weapons—including sniper rifles, submachine guns, and assault rifles—they rarely fire them outside of training. A recent study of forty SWAT units from agencies serving 250,000 or more people disclosed that these teams discharged firearms only in sixty-four of the several thousand incidents they handled from 1990 through 1996. Because the only shots fired in many of these sixty-four incidents were directed at nonhuman targets (such as vehicles and street-lights), it is apparent that the shooting of a citizen by a SWAT team is an extremely rare event.
This low rate of deadly force use may be at least partly attributable to the fact that early in the evolution of SWAT, verbal tactics emerged as a vital part of how the police sought to manage special threat situations. Rooted in the fundamental precept that most crises can be resolved by de-escalation, police agencies developed training programs to teach officers how to negotiate with hostile individuals, in hopes of talking them into surrender. Some agencies use SWAT team members as negotiators; others have separate negotiation units. Whatever the structuring of the tactical and negotiation components in a given agency, SWAT teams rely heavily on negotiations to help resolve special threat situations.
Episodes such as these—coupled with a recent upswing in SWAT activity aimed at enforcing drug laws (primarily by serving search warrants)—have led to calls from some quarters to reform SWAT teams and operations. Critics charge that SWAT teams have become “militarized,” affecting a combat footing that flows from the “war on drugs” rhetoric that has animated U.S. drug policy in recent years, and also from other cultural forces that foster military posturing. The critics further argue that there are simply too many SWAT teams, singling out those from smaller jurisdictions, which rarely experience the sorts of crises that SWAT was created to handle.
This critical clamor reflects the basic tension about police powers that has existed in the United States since the first urban police departments were instituted on the east coast during the middle of the nineteenth century. Americans have always feared that tyranny could arise from the government agencies they devised to protect them from criminal assault. One hundred fifty years ago this was fear of ill-equipped, poorly trained individual policemen. Today it is fear of well-trained teams of officers who possess the latest in social control technology. Thus, although SWAT teams possess special weapons and employ specialized tactics, they operate in the same culture of ambivalence as the rest of American law enforcement.
There are widely different perspectives on prostitution. Some view the prostitutes as primarily responsible for the problem; some view the clients as responsible, and the prostitutes as victims. Others view prostitution as a private matter in which the state should not intervene. Community morals and beliefs about how the law should regulate morality will affect how any particular community addresses street prostitution.
Street prostitutes have lower status than indoor prostitutes. They are often in some state of personal decline (e.g., running away from abusive situations, becoming drug-dependent, deteriorating psychologically, and/or getting less physically attractive). Most have social, economic, and health problems. Most first turn to prostitution at a young age, often before they are 18.
Street prostitutes are not equally committed to prostitution: some are deeply committed for financial and lifestyle reasons; some are committed only due to drug dependency; and some are weakly committed, engaging in prostitution because it is the easiest way for them to make some money. Their inability to find adequately paying work elsewhere is the most common reason prostitutes give to explain their choice to work on the street.
Many prostitutes try to leave the streets, although they often return and then leave again. Most return to prostitution because of their limited education and lack of skills make finding employment very difficult. Without a means to support themselves and their children, they may think staying on the streets is less risky than leaving prostitution.
Prostitution clients, typically referred to as johns or tricks, are attracted to the illicit nature of the encounter, desire sex acts that regular partners do not provide, view sex as merely a commodity, and/or lack interest in or access to conventional relationships. Others are drawn to the fact that no commitment is required, and view these interactions as less risky than having an affair. Clients’ decision to solicit a prostitute is influenced by the availability of prostitutes, knowledge of where to find them, access to money, perceived risk of getting caught or contracting disease, and ease of securing services. Clients gather such information in a variety of ways: from trial and error; from personal recommendations from others (including friends, bartenders, taxi drivers, and hotel workers); and, increasingly, from information posted on internet websites.
Somewhere around 10 to 20 percent of men admit they have paid for sex, but only about 1 percent pay for sex regularly. While this is still a large number of potential clients, it is considerably lower than some earlier estimates based on flawed research methods. The characteristics of men arrested for soliciting vary considerably and do not form any clear patterns. Many seek to rationalize their conduct to themselves and others. When stopped by police, clients often try to justify their behavior by telling a sob story of personal loss, or will admit to cruising but not soliciting, stating they were just curious. Others resist the idea that prostitution is immoral.
Clients are more easily deterred than prostitutes. They are more readily ashamed of their behavior, and fear harming their public reputation or their standing in their personal lives. Consequently, they fear being identified publicly more than being fined for their conduct.
Street prostitution and street drug markets are often closely linked, supporting and reinforcing one another. Many street prostitutes use illegal drugs, mainly methamphetamine, cocaine, or heroin. Many female serious drug users turn to prostitution at some point to finance their habit. Some prostitutes develop drug habits before turning to prostitution, while others start using drugs as part of the street prostitution lifestyle. Prostitutes are a significant customer base for street-level drug dealers.
Crack cocaine markets drive down the price of street prostitution, as some prostitutes, desperate to buy drugs, sell sex cheaply. Other prostitutes resent them for driving down prices or permitting sex without condoms, and pimps punish them for withholding their earnings to buy drugs. Drug-dependent prostitutes are more vulnerable to violence and more likely to rob their clients. In summary, where drugs and street prostitution are linked, street prostitution becomes less predictable and more dangerous.
Enforcing laws prohibiting prostitution usually requires undercover police officers to pose as clients to gather the necessary evidence, which can be difficult to get from street-savvy prostitutes. Enforcing prostitution laws against clients typically requires the police to pose as prostitutes to get evidence. Some police agencies still do not have enough female officers to conduct effective solicitation enforcement campaigns, and these assignments are typically not popular among officers. Moreover, decoy arrests of clients are open to legal entrapment defenses if officers are not careful.
The main strategy police use to control street prostitution is enforcing laws prohibiting soliciting, patronizing, and loitering for the purposes of prostitution. Enforcement strategies are expensive; each arrest costs thousands of dollars to process. By themselves, they are ineffective at either controlling street prostitution or protecting prostitutes from harm.
In addition to routinely enforcing prostitution laws, the police often conduct intensive arrest campaigns against prostitutes, clients, or both. These campaigns significantly increase the risks of arrest, at least temporarily, bringing large numbers of prostitutes and clients into the formal justice system. When combined with media coverage, the campaigns are intended to deter those arrested from re-offending and to deter potential clients. The campaigns deterrent value wears off after time, however. In high-volume arrest campaigns, the chances that police will arrest innocent people increase unless they take special precautions. Without some follow-up court intervention or measures to change the environment, intensive enforcement campaigns only temporarily interrupt street prostitution, or move it elsewhere: they do not shut down a street prostitution market entirely.
The most effective responses to the problem of street prostitution rely heavily on social services for prostitutes to encourage their permanent exit from the street. Police must work closely with service providers to ensure the various enforcement- and treatment-based responses are well-coordinated. The transient nature of street prostitution and the fact that some responses may lead to displacement mean that jurisdictions must share information to make a significant regional impact on the problem.
Domestic disputes are some of the most common calls for police service. Many domestic disputes do not involve violence; this guide discusses those that do, as well as the measures that can be used to reduce them. In the United States, domestic violence accounts for about 20 percent of the nonfatal violent crime women experience and three percent of the nonfatal violent crime men experience.
Harm levels vary from simple assault to homicide, with secondary harms to child witnesses. Domestic violence calls can be quite challenging for police as they are likely to observe repetitive abuse against the same victims, who may not be able to or may not want to part from their abusers. Police typically view these calls as dangerous, partly because old research exaggerated the risks to police.
Why Some Women are Reluctant to End Abusive Relationships
Police commonly express frustration that many of the battered women they deal with do not leave their batterers. Although many women do leave physically abusive relationships, others remain even after police intervene. There is no reliable information about the percentage of women who stay in physically abusive relationships. Researchers offer a number of explanations for the resistance by some to leave an abuser.
Cycle of violence. Three cyclical phases in physically abusive intimate relationships keep a woman in the relationship: 1) a tension-building phase that includes minor physical and verbal abuse, 2) an acute battering phase, and 3) a makeup or honeymoon phase. The honeymoon phase lulls an abused woman into staying and the cycle repeats itself.
Battered woman syndrome. A woman is so fearful from experiencing cycles of violence that she no longer believes escape is possible.
Stockholm syndrome. A battered woman is essentially a hostage to her batterer. She develops a bond with and shows support for and kindness to her captor, perhaps because of her isolation from and deprivation of more normal relationships.
Traumatic bonding theory. A battered woman experienced unhealthy or anxious attachments to her parents who abused or neglected her. The woman develops unhealthy attachments in her adult relationships and accepts intermittent violence from her intimate partner. She believes the affection and claims of remorse that follow because she needs positive acceptance from and bonding with the batterer.
Psychological entrapment theory. A woman feels she has invested so much in the relationship, she is willing to tolerate the battering to save it.
A multifactor ecological perspective. Staying in physically abusive relationships is the result of a combination of factors, including family history, personal relationships, societal norms, and social and cultural factors.
Comprehensive and collaborative approaches to reducing domestic violence are more likely to succeed than piecemeal approaches, but they require a significant commitment from all participating. An offense as complex as domestic violence is unlikely to be prevented by a single measure. A thorough assessment of the current overall response to domestic violence can identify critical gaps in strategies, resources, and response protocols.
Although some communities have adopted a more integrated approach engaging advocates, police, and the criminal justice system, for the most part, recidivism remains high. In the small studies of these integrated domestic violence approaches, there is evidence that victim satisfaction is high but insufficient evidence that recidivism and revictimization rates have decreased. One commentary suggests that the small core of persistent batterers (who are violent toward others as well as their intimates) are perhaps resistant to even highly coordinated efforts.
To improve the likelihood that a comprehensive approach reduces recidivism and victimization requires a continuum of responses depending on the most reliable research and covering the different points in time most important to reducing domestic abuse: before an incident to keep it from occurring, during an incident to stop the immediate violence, and after an incident to reduce or prevent revictimization. It involves responses that focus on victims and potential victims and strategies that focus on offenders and potential offenders. As well, it involves the improved identification and reporting of cases of abuse between current and former intimates and dating partners.
Some police agencies participate in domestic violence awareness campaigns and school programming, such as classroom instruction to teens about dating violence and ways to handle conflict. Domestic violence prevention messages may target the general population or specific populations. For example, campaigns may be designed to encourage victim reporting, deter potential offenders, or raise the consciousness of potential witnesses of abuse (neighbors, friends, relatives).
The effect of these prevention strategies is unknown. For instance, few of the programs developed to reduce teen dating violence have been evaluated, and of those that have, there have been mixed results. Although some report an increase in knowledge in the targeted population and greater familiarity with available resources to help victims, this does not necessarily translate into a reduction in the incidence level of dating violence.
The narcotics bureau is generally considered the center of the police response to drug trafficking and use. That operational unit aims directly at the source of the problem and mounts the most sophisticated investigations against drug traffickers. It also accumulates the greatest substantive knowledge about drugs in general and in the local community.
Although the narcotics bureau is at the center of the attack, police strategists must recognize that other operating elements of the police department also confront drug trafficking and use. For example, many police departments have established specialized units to attack organized crime or criminal gangs. These units deal with narcotics trafficking because (1) the organized crime groups or gangs that are their central targets are involved in drug dealing; or (2) they have access to informants who can usefully guide narcotics investigations; or (3) they have specialized equipment that can be used in sophisticated drug investigations.
Regular patrol and investigative units also inevitably attack drug trafficking, use, and related violence. Insofar as their efforts are focused generally on street crime, and insofar as drug users commit a large portion of these crimes, patrol units and detectives wind up arresting a great many drug users. Regular patrol and investigative units also end up arresting some drug users for narcotics offenses such as illegal possession and use of drugs. In most cases, the person arrested will not be on probation or parole and must be tried to be punished. In other cases, however, the drug offenses will constitute probation or parole violations that could result in immediate incarceration if the local court system took such offenses seriously.
The patrol bureau will also be engaged in the fight against drugs as a result of calls from citizens complaining about drug dealing in specific locations. Often, in response to citizen complaints or at the initiative of the chief, special drug task forces will be formed to deal with a particularly threatening or flagrant drug market. These operations draw on patrol forces as well as detective units. Typically, they last for a while and then go out of existence.
Somewhat more specialized are those units committed to drug education. Although drug education seems like a significant departure from the usual objectives and methods of policing, increasingly police departments are establishing such programs to fill a perceived void in this important demand-reducing function.
More likely than not, whether or not a juvenile is processed into this system is dependent upon the outcome of an encounter with the police. It is accurate to say that the police serve as the “gatekeepers” to the juvenile justice system—they serve this function in the adult system as well. The police, in turn, begin the criminal justice process by making initial decisions about how to handle incidents involving juveniles. Indeed, the role of the police in juvenile justice is an important one.
Police officers have many contacts with juveniles that are for the most part unknown. For this reason, the cases that reach the juvenile courts are only a small fraction of the interactions that police have with juvenile suspects and offenders. In deciding how to handle incidents involving youth, the police have a wide range of responses available to them.
This latitude is a necessary element to police work as patrol officers are presented with various and often complex situations. However, in light of this discretion, one should be concerned with how police make decisions involving juveniles as it is an important decision, one that may formally classify juveniles (correctly or incorrectly) as delinquents and introduce them to the juvenile justice system.
Today most police agencies have juvenile units or juvenile specialists, but the focus of the juvenile officer in metropolitan agencies has evolved over time. Juvenile specialists now operate as detectives, and are called juvenile unit detectives, juvenile specialists, and so on. They are embraced as an essential part of police departments and are no longer viewed as the add-on that they once were. Juvenile officers spend much of their day doing investigative work, following up on juvenile crimes and on juvenile victimization.
This is not to say that juvenile officers never spend time involved in crime prevention, that crime prevention can no longer be their sole focus. In terms of prevention, juvenile officers still spend some time forming police athletic leagues and youth diversion programs that began in the middle of the twentieth century. It is also common for juvenile detectives to make appearances at elementary, middle, and high schools to deter juvenile crime and to speak out against drug use and gang formation.
In fact, many metropolitan departments train one or more officers to work directly with school children of all ages, educating students on the consequences of delinquency and drug use. One particular prevention program, DARE (Drug Abuse Resistance Education), became very popular nationwide during the 1990s.
During the 1990s many police departments hired officers to work specifically on the DARE project. DARE, which was developed in the Los Angeles, California, police department as a drug prevention program for school children, uses uniformed patrol officers to educate school children on the dangers of drug use. DARE officers often had offices within public schools, where kids could easily access information or ask questions.
Early evaluations suggested that DARE worked and as a result, many departments in the 1990s assigned uniformed officers to the DARE project. Unfortunately, extended evaluations of this program now suggests that the long-term effects of project DARE are not as beneficial as once thought; in fact, they may be nonexistent. For this reason, many departments are phasing out DARE as a preventive measure or are at least restructuring the program.
The role of the juvenile officer or detective continues to evolve, and with time involvement in investigation has taken precedence over prevention, although this may change with new reforms in policing. Under the umbrella of community and problem-oriented policing, police departments nationwide are beginning to form partnerships with communities so that they can be more efficient at preventing crime.
This new approach to policing will surely influence how police address issues of juvenile crime. In 1998 and 1999 President Bill Clinton awarded millions of dollars in School-Based Partnership grants, which funded partnerships between the police, schoolchildren, and the community. The goal of these partnerships was to target specific problems of school crime and violence and to develop a link between kids and cops. Evaluations of these projects are ongoing.
In today’s police environment, Internal Affairs, also commonly called Offices of Professional Standards, are more important than they have ever been. Claims of misconduct and video recordings of police actions are now posted on to social media sites as they happen and given freely to television stations. Investigators should make sure they ask complainants if any video exists and strive to get copies when possible. If officers are wearing cameras, that footage may be the most important piece of evidence you collect.
The Fort Worth Example: “The purpose of the Internal Affairs Section is to investigate or coordinate the investigation of allegations of misconduct, including criminal misconduct, against police department employees, maintain related records and liaison the City Attorney’s office to handle legal process that affect the police department.”
Examples of investigations are allegations related to the following:
- Excessive force
- Sexual harassment
- Hostile work environment
- Disparate treatment due to gender, race, ethnicity, age or sexual orientation
- Retaliation for reporting the misconduct of another
- Inappropriate conduct or comment of a sexual nature
- Inappropriate comment regarding gender, race, ethnicity, age or sexual orientation
Some states regulate internal affairs investigations as a matter of state law. Texas law, for example, requires that all complaints against police officers must be in writing and signed by the person making the complaint. Complaints must be made within 60 days of the incident complained about, except in special cases (such as criminal misconduct or when good cause can be shown by the person making the complaint). Complaints must be made by the person aggrieved (wronged). Other persons may give statements as witnesses.
It is wise to have a formalized, written policy that describes each step of the internal investigation. It serves as a guide to your employees, and it lets the subject of the complaint know what to expect. This policy should outline what the investigation will include and what steps will be followed. For example, a letter will always be sent to the complainant to serve as confirmation of their complaint. It is best to keep consistency to the investigation by following all the steps all the time. It only complicates things when two citizens find they have been treated differently when they made complaints against the police. It distracts from the real purpose of the investigation and seriously erodes trust in the police department.
Some departments feel that the credibility of the complainant should be assured by requiring a sworn statement from those who make the complaint. This can ensure sincerity, but it can also discourage honest people who may be skeptical or reticent. At no time should a department seek to discourage a person from making a complaint because the investigation process is embarrassing or difficult. A Community’s trust in their local police department is solidified when our citizens know we want their input and will amend policies, procedures, and behaviors if we find we have made mistakes.
Some departments, as well as some state legislatures, have developed special protocols for special types of citizen complaint. In 2001, the Texas Legislature passed a law prohibiting “Racial Profiling.” According to the statute, police officers may not take any enforcement-initiating action based on an individuals race, ethnicity, or national origin rather than on the individual’s behavior or on information identifying the individual as having engaged in criminal activity.
Examples of “Racial Profiling” include but are not limited to:
- Initiating a traffic stop on a particular vehicle because of the race, ethnicity, or national origin of the driver a vehicle.
- Stopping or detaining the driver of a vehicle based on the determination that a person of that race, ethnicity, or national origin is unlikely to own or possess that specific make or model.
- Stopping or detaining an individual based upon the determination that a person of that race, ethnicity, or national origin is unlikely to be in that place or part of town.
- Stopping a driver when looking for a suspect if the only commonality between the suspect and the driver is their race, ethnicity, or national origin.
- Singling out an individual for enforcement who is part of a group of individuals exhibiting similar behavior (for example, a group of drivers exceeding the speed limit) because of the individual’s race, ethnicity, or national origin.
Policing has always been an evolving profession, but technological advancements in the past 20 years have accelerated that change and dramatically altered the landscape of crime. Police departments are now expected to protect their community members from local offenders committing “traditional” crimes, as well as computer hackers 10,000 miles away. This new cyber threat has developed so quickly that local police agencies haven’t had time to fully prepare themselves and identify their role in preventing cybercrime and investigating crimes that are committed.
The Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3), a joint effort by the FBI and the National White Collar Crime Center, is the best source of information about the extent of Internet crime. In 2012, the most recent year for which national statistics are available, IC3 received nearly 290,000 complaints from victims who reported total losses of $545 million.
One international event in 2013, involving thefts from ATM machines over a 10-hour period, resulted in losses of $45 million—more than the total losses from all “traditional” bank robberies in the United States over the course of a year. At the local level, police chiefs are noticing that gangs are switching from illegal drug sales to cyber-scams to generate money, because cybercrime is easier and safer for the criminals.
Often, low-level offenders are operating unchallenged: The FBI, Secret Service, and other federal agencies are focusing their limited resources on the largest cases. Cybercrimes involving losses of $500 or less are often considered too small even for local police to investigate, much less federal agencies, because of the jurisdictional issues and other challenges. Many local police executives acknowledge that currently they are “behind the curve” in finding a role for their agencies with cybercrime.
Despite all of these challenges, we must take on cybercrime. As of early 2014, the government has staked out a major role for law enforcement at the federal level. But most of the 18,000 local and state law enforcement agencies have not yet developed plans and jurisdictional authority to enter this arena. This report is a wake-up call to state and local police leaders to get in the game.
While overall crime in the United States is down almost to 1960s levels, cybercrime is increasing. Local and state governments must recognize that the crime-fighting successes of these past 50 years are not preparing us for the new crimes of this millennium.
In addition to standalone computer crimes, nearly every crime in today’s world has a technological component. Investigators find that since everyone has a smartphone that links them to social media, nearly every crime will have important evidence in the form of a text, facebook post, tweet, and so forth. Even crimes such as street robberies often result in the need to analyze data from stolen smartphones to determine the GPS location of the phone and thus the suspect. This means that all police departments must prepare to investigate computer crimes as well as crimes involving data as evidence.
Consumer trust is vital for private-sector corporations, so data breaches can be catastrophic for business. As a result, when cybercriminals take money from a victim’s bank account or make fraudulent charges on a victim’s credit card, the banks or credit card companies often reimburse the victim for the losses, rather than suffer bad publicity about their customers being victimized.
While this approach makes the situation easier for the victim and it may make sense for the businesses, there are significant disadvantages. If the victim’s first phone call is to the bank and the bank quickly reimburses the victim, the victim may never even think to report the crime to the police. If the crimes are never reported, they are not investigated by law enforcement agencies or counted in crime statistics. And the perpetrators remain free to commit more crimes.
References and Further Reading
CRITICAL ISSUES IN POLICING SERIES The Role of Local Law Enforcement Agencies In Preventing and Investigating Cybercrime. PERF. https://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Critical_Issues_Series_2/the%20role%20of%20local%20law%20enforcement%20agencies%20in%20preventing%20and%20investigating%20cybercrime%202014.pdf
Domestic Violence Guide No. 45. (2006) https://popcenter.asu.edu/content/domestic-violence-0
Internal Affairs: A Strategy for Smaller Departments. https://www.theiacp.org/sites/default/files/2018-08/BP-InternalAffairs.pdf
“Police: Handling of Juveniles.” Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice. Retrieved February 23, 2019 from Encyclopedia.com: https://www.encyclopedia.com/law/legal-and-political-magazines/police-handling-juveniles
“Police: Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Teams.” Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice. Retrieved March 02, 2019 from Encyclopedia.com: https://www.encyclopedia.com/law/legal-and-political-magazines/police-special-weapons-and-tactics-swat-teams
“Police: Organization and Management.” Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice. Retrieved March 03, 2019 from Encyclopedia.com: https://www.encyclopedia.com/law/legal-and-political-magazines/police-organization-and-management
Problem Oriented Drug Enforcement: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/problem.pdfStreet
Prostitution 2nd Edition Guide No.2 (2006) https://popcenter.asu.edu/problems/street_prostitution/
Modification History File Created: 08/15/2018 Last Modified: 06/21/2019
This work is licensed under an Open Educational Resource-Quality Master Source (OER-QMS) License.